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Introduction
The goal of every theater commander during conflict is to bring that conflict to an end on favorable terms. This truth alone makes conflict termination critically important; and yet, history has shown that this task is often misunderstood and seldom correctly executed. Current joint and service doctrine has improved by discussing conflict termination, but still remains insufficient as a primary source upon which the theater commander and his staff can refer to during conflict planning and execution.
With respect to conflict termination, this paper discusses the responsibilities of the theater commander in broad scope (phases and backwards planning), lists some key considerations that the theater commander should incorporate in planning and execution, discusses the importance of the interagency process for national security policy-making, and most importantly,
shows that current doctrine is improving, but remains insufficient in assisting the commander during his important task of planning for conflict termination. Current military doctrine clearly focuses the commander on how to fight a war, but must be further adapted to include specifics on how to end a war. Lastly, recommendations to the current planning processes (contingency planning and crisis action planning) 5 are offered to ensure that the theater commander focuses on conflict termination throughout the spectrum of planning.
Phases and Backwards Planning
The theater commander is responsible for planning and executing all phases of a military conflict including termination of that conflict. He must work closely with the President of the United States (POTUS), the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), and other interagency personnel to ensure military objectives support the political objectives, and thus lead to the desired end state. The military role following the conflict termination is usually substantive to include conducting negotiations and post-hostility operations, often called the stability and reconstruction phase or now referred to as phase IV (stabilize) and phase V (enable civil authority). 6 How the conflict is fought bears directly on the phases that follow. Therefore, it is essential that the theater commander know what the desired end state is before he plans how to conduct the conflict itself. Failure to execute this backwards planning cycle can easily lead to military victory without long-term political success as illustrated in the Desert Storm Vignette.
However, experience has shown that the theater commander may not get a clear end state from POTUS and/or SECDEF. If this is the case -and it usually is -the commander must make the best educated guess at what he believes the political end state is, and then, he must share this vision with POTUS/SECDEF (bottom up, vice top down approach).
FIGURE 1 7
The tremendous importance of the two-way communication channel that must be established between POTUS/SECDEF and the theater commander cannot be overstated. The theater commander should not begin the first stage of pre-hostility actions (see Fig. 1 ) without considering what POTUS/SECDEF want the end state to look like. Clausewitz knew this nearly two centuries ago by stating that one should not take the first step in war without considering the last. 8 Liddel Hart said, "…it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire." 9 In direct conflict to these premises, Fred Ikle reminds us that historically many war plans pay little, if any, attention to their desired endings. 10 This demonstrates that even though historians generally recognize the importance of backwards planning, many planners fail to properly execute the backwards planning process. Planning for the end state requires significant effort and includes many considerations surrounding conflict termination.
Conflict Termination Considerations
Why do we often fail in conflict termination? Several considerations exist which make ending a conflict difficult and which limit rational calculations in conflict termination.
Costs/benefits analysis, victory disease, social dimensions, coalitions, and negotiations are among the most important considerations.
Clausewitz correctly proposed that when the costs of a war exceed the benefits that can be attained, that country should end the war. 11 However, it is very difficult for a country to recognize the location of this point. Stopping the conflict could end without the achievement of the political objectives; however, continuing the conflict could raise the costs (or risks) without having ensured a political victory. The theater commander should weigh costs versus benefits when considering conflict termination, and then make a recommendation via SECDEF for a Ends, ways, and means are the key factors that any policy-making body should examine before making or recommending decisions. Ends are the political objectives desired; ways are the strategic concepts, courses of action, or how the ends are to be accomplished; means are the resources available to accomplish the objectives. 15 When making or recommending policy, the interagency system must examine all three of these key factors and ensure that Art Lykke's "stool" remains balanced: the imbalance generated by too little or too great of ends, ways, or means (the length of the stool legs) is associated with the risk for that particular policy. 16 Persuading multiple agencies with separate interests to agree or compromise on what an objective should be, on the method to pursue the objective, and on what resources are available and should be allocated is a difficult task. It takes skilled negotiators and compromise to build consensus, especially when the risk of failure has significant consequences (national security implications).
Unity of effort among role-playing agencies is required to design and execute national security policy. Diverging interests, personalities, and cultures constantly work against unity of effort. Interagency diversity "…with each agency having its own culture, hierarchy, bias, misconceptions, and unique perspectives, makes unity of effort difficult." 17 However, if properly led, it is these same differences that, through dialogue, work in concert to develop the best possible policy options. Properly led is a key element. Unity of command among the various agencies is required to keep work effort and decision recommendations on-track. Because US national cabinet agencies and other supporting governmental and non-governmental agencies have different interests, a clearly designated leader/agency to guide the dialogue and drive it toward a national policy decision is required. In his Joint Force Quarterly article, Matthew
Bogdanos said that the US interagency process today "…expects unity of effort without unity of command," 18 but has often failed to achieve the integrated effort required. Therefore, the necessary control and direction of the interagency process did not exist, and the US entered Iraq without a feasible, interagency-coordinated, post-hostility stabilization and reconstruction plan. Executing a conflict termination correctly is more difficult when its effects upon an undetermined reconstruction plan are not known.
Another characteristic of sound interagency productivity is time. Especially in today's world of globalization, the tempo of actions and information has exponentially increased. This enormous increase in tempo requires speedy policy decisions and reactions. However, the US interagency process is somewhat awkward and slow by its nature. Using Policy Coordinating
Committees, the Deputies Committee, the Principals Committee, and the National Security
Council to vet policy vertically and horizontally is a slow process, especially when world focus at each level is required. Quickening the interagency policymaking and decision-making processes are critical for success in the future high-tempo, globalized world because the theater commander will have to react more quickly while at the same time requiring input from these processes. Especially during a crisis, the theater commander needs a speedy, unifying interagency effort and rapid POTUS/SECDEF directions and decisions in order to complete planning and begin execution. important post-hostility information such as public health, water, agriculture, finance, justice, and public outreach assessments; however, because the study was largely research and not directly actionable information, DoD elected to plan independently from DoS efforts. 22 Several recommendations for improvement to the US interagency process have been proposed including legislation for a Goldwater-Nichols-like change, assignment of a supported/supporting relationship among agencies during policy development and implementation, shifting to a more regionalized focus for interagency productivity, and/or giving more interagency power to our current military combatant commanders. Detailed discussion of these options for improvement to the current interagency process is beyond the scope of this conflict termination paper, but suffice it to say that change is required. The need for the theater commander to get clear policy, guidance, and resources from the national security interagency process is crucial and his planning should not be guided by military termination alone, but his operational plans must set the stage for continued US interaction by peaceful means. 23 
Doctrinal Publications
The theater commander has a plethora of publications for use as resources. Before forces are committed, commanders must know how POTUS/SECDEF intend to terminate the operation and ensure its outcomes endure; and then, theater commanders can determine how to implement that strategic design at the operational level. This makes conflict termination both science and art. Thus, commanders must consider the conditions necessary to bring operations to a favorable end by translating political aims into strategy and operational design. Additionally, post-conflict activities become another burden of the theater commander because it is his job to facilitate the transition from military conflict to a lasting peace.
26
JP 3-0 is an outstanding publication when considering conflict termination planning and execution. The next version of JP 3-0 is currently in second draft, and it further develops early planning and interagency coordination as keys to examining a solid plan for conflict termination. 27 The new draft version provides better insight into the importance of interagency coordination and the methods in which to accomplish that coordination. Additionally, it specifically reminds the combatant commander to "…work closely with the civilian leadership in ensuring a clearly defined end state is established."
28
The national political leadership and the theater commander have dual responsibilities. It is incumbent upon POTUS/SECDEF to give the theater commander a clear picture of the end state that is desired prior to the conflict commencing. Reciprocally, the theater commander must inform POTUS/SECDEF of critical information that is required to reassess political and military goals. For example, the condition of friendly and enemy forces, morale, and military success probability are items that POTUS/SECDEF require in order to reassess the political objectives of the conflict. Costs, risks, and benefits are continuously reevaluated at the strategic and operational levels of war. Overall, JP 3-0 tells the theater commander to consider conflict termination before and during planning for the conflict, and also gives him multiple considerations to contemplate while making his plan for a conflict. Quarterly article on war termination planning noted, "Anyone using JOPES and in need of clarification on termination criteria will not find it in Pub 5-0." 31 The third draft revision of JP 5-0 is published for review, and it does not provide any additional conflict termination guidance.
However, it does substantially improve the organization and responsibilities section and adds a section on interagency considerations.
32
Joint Publication 5-00.1 (JP 5-00.1) Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning. This joint publication provides guidance and principles for campaign level planning and is specifically focused for theater commanders and joint force levels. 33 It reiterates other joint publications in its efforts to ensure military planning is not conducted in isolation of other governmental interagency efforts seeking the achievement of national strategic objectives. 34 It reminds staffs that strategic guidance is the primary driving factor for contingency planning. 35 JP 5-00.1 states, "The strategic guidance must establish whether the combatant commander is to pursue a limited or unlimited strategic (political) objective." 36 Similarly, the combatant commander must understand the conflict termination criteria for the campaign. The combatant commander should directly request further guidance or clarification if POTUS/SECDEF have not adequately articulated the conflict termination criteria. 37 Of particular importance, JP 5-00.1 gives planners a wide variety of operational issues that must be considered when addressing conflict termination. 38 JP 5-00.1 stresses that keeping conflict termination as a key aspect of the planning process and emphasizing backward planning to ensure that conflict termination is considered early are vital planning lessons. 39 Chapters III and IV detail the contingency and CAP processes, respectively. Importantly however, as each phase of each planning process is discussed, conflict termination reminders are not found. Overall, JP 5-00.1 provides a superb sub-section on conflict termination, but falls short in detail by not ensuring the planners at each phase of contingency planning or CAP reevaluate conflict termination and its implications.
Joint Publication 5-00.2 (JP 5-00.2) Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and
Procedures. This publication details information concerning establishment, organization, and staffing of a Joint Task Force (JTF). It describes functions and responsibilities of the JTF staff directorates. Specifically, chapter IX is dedicated to JTF plans and policy. In addition to outlining the organization and responsibilities of the J-5, this chapter focuses on joint planning processes to include campaign planning, contingency planning, and CAP. 40 Included in the chapter are valuable planning checklists for the J-5 or others to use. Conflict termination planning and an associated checklist are included. Planners are reminded that conflict termination planning must be ongoing throughout all phases of operations to include initial course of action development. 41 The checklist provided is a great tool for the commander and planners. Its focus on end state, post-conflict requirements to include security planning, redeployment of forces, transition planning, and other expectations help remind planners to consider important elements. 42 The follow-on transition planning sub-section provides additional considerations for operational planners. Although making huge strides in the right direction, still an actual planning sequence and conflict termination considerations throughout all phases of planning are not detailed in this publication. This publication is clearly written for the JTF Commander and his planning team, however, the conflict termination concepts and planning details should still be emphasized because success or failure at the JTF level can affect the theater commander's conflict termination plan.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3122.01 (CJCSM 3122.01), Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures). CJCSM 3122.01 is the replacement document to Joint Publication 5-03.1, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume I -Planning Policies and Procedures , which
has been discontinued. It provides specific guidance and doctrine to combatant commanders and other joint force commanders in preparing appropriate plans in response to predicted or crisis action conflicts. In the new adaptive planning process, the operational commander has 6-12 months of time in which to plan (the old deliberate planning cycle allowed 18-24 months time to plan). 43 CAP is very similar, however, but is time compressed due to the crisis situation.
Time available for planning may only be hours or days. CJCSM 3122.01 provides a good checklist for CAP which correlates with the six phases of a crisis. 44 Because CAP is time sensitive, a checklist of this type is very helpful. Again however, no direct reference to conflict termination or to POTUS/SECDEF and theater commander liaison concerning conflict termination is made in the checklist.
Individual Service Doctrine. Operational planners at Combatant Commands (COCOMs)
primarily rely on joint doctrine to assist and guide them through the joint planning processes.
However, for most officers, assignments to a COCOM as a joint planner will be their first joint assignment and very few will have had exposure to joint doctrine. Therefore, it is important to review how the individual services' doctrine addresses conflict termination, because it is service doctrine to which joint planners have had the greatest exposure. . This publication provides the best strategic overview of any service doctrine; it is the only service publication that specifically states that the political objectives may be multi-national in nature. 45 Commanders need to understand and use all instruments of national power with military efforts to achieve political objectives through dynamic strategic capabilities. 46 However, the section on planning fails to mention conflict termination. It discusses phasing, branches and sequels, concept of operations, and risk management, but falls short in directing operational commanders to remain focused on the end state. 47 In the "Follow-On Operations" section, FM 3-0 has a brief sub-section on conflict termination and reminds commanders and staffs to consider conflict termination requirements when developing campaign plans, but is inadequate in listing or describing what conflict termination requirements might be. ends through some kind of termination strategy. 50 Political leaders must make the decision when to terminate combat operations, but military leaders must be participants in the decisionmaking process. 51 Additionally, MCDP 1-2 tells staffs and commanders that planning for conflict termination begins at the earliest possible moment and continues throughout the campaign progression. The question of what constitutes an acceptable political and military end state is raised and planners are reminded that if the political end state is not achieved, then military operations may have to be resumed. 52 Risk is always associated with conflict termination and commanders must address a plethora of operational issues including disengagement, force protection, transition to post-conflict operations, and reconstitution and redeployment. 53 Overall, MCDP 1-2 provides sufficient conflict termination planning reminders, but similar to many joint publications, it fails to take the next step by providing phased checklists and planning methodology that includes conflict termination planning criteria throughout. Planning, provides any substantive material useful to theater commanders or their planners regarding conflict termination. NDP 1 describes the Navy's warfighting philosophy, and the authors state that protracted war causes high casualties and unwanted political and economic consequences; therefore, the key goal is to rapidly conclude hostilities. 55 NDP 1 fails to assist the commander in planning for conflict termination other than recommending that he achieve a rapid victory. NDP-5 stresses that success in warfare is dependent upon sound planning. 56 Force commanders plan and execute their assigned air and space missions. 60 Further, AFDD 1 describes the relationship between policy, strategy, and doctrine by stating, "Victory in war is not measured by casualties inflicted, battles won or lost, number of tanks destroyed, or territory occupied, but by the achievement of (or failure to achieve) national policy objectives." 61 The centerpiece argument expressed in Air Force doctrine is that air and space power offer national leadership an alternative to the annihilation and attrition warfare of the past, 62 but AFDD 1 fails to connect the commander directly with the importance of conflict termination planning. AFDD 1 merely sells the reader on the capabilities of air and space.
Air Force Doctrine Document 2 (AFDD 2), Organization and Employment of Aerospace
Power, is the capstone document of the Air Force operational doctrine series. AFDD 2 is a companion document to AFDD 1 focusing on how the Air Force organizes and employs aerospace power throughout the spectrum of conflict. 63 It contains a section on conflict termination which reminds planners that conflict termination is a vital aspect of tying military actions to strategic objectives. AFDD 2 states that hostilities will normally cease by one of three ways: by the victor imposing his will using force until the vanquished gives up or surrenders, through negotiated settlement, or by third party settlement imposition. 64 It further states, "Termination planning should establish the conditions and detail the actions needed to attain the chosen national security goals and objectives." 65 Additionally, AFDD 2 reminds the planner that termination planning needs to begin prior to the conflict itself; however, this task is difficult and often requires multiple revisions to termination plans because of the changing nature of the conflict or the changing political objectives. Overall, AFDD 2 does a good job reminding commanders and staff of the importance of early planning for conflict termination, but it remains general guidance and does not provide planning checklists or methodology for planning.
Since individual service doctrine is where officers learn TTPs, the service doctrine needs to emphasize critical concepts and basic planning procedures including that of conflict termination. In general, individual military service doctrine is not adequate in providing conflict termination considerations throughout the planning processes. Joint publications, especially JP 3-0 and JP 5-00.2, are much better in giving the theater commander and his staff guidance in planning for conflict termination, but these same personnel must begin their education through their individual services.
The 1995 Joint Forces Quarterly war termination article states that JOPES is the process that is used by joint planners to integrate policy decisions with military planning and execution at national, theater, and supporting organizational levels. 66 Therefore, JOPES should facilitate contingency and CAP planning by providing operational planners with detailed checklists at each phase of planning. CJCSM 3122.01 attempts to provide planners a planning checklist, but noticeably absent from the publication is specific considerations about conflict termination in each phase of the planning processes. Since theater commanders lose experienced planners regularly as officers rotate from staff planning positions, military doctrine needs to provide sufficient detail to assist new planners in properly planning for conflict termination. Detailed checklists which include conflict termination considerations and criteria for each phase of the operation will provide the outline that theater commanders require for successful staff planning.
Contingency planning is not normally time sensitive. Therefore, a theater commander and his planners have more time to refer to the multitude of publications, thus reminding themselves of the critical nature of conflict termination. However, CAP does not necessarily afford the commander and his staff the time required to read through several publications to digest the importance of early and continuous planning for conflict termination. Therefore, a critical weakness in the CAP process is that no clear outline for conflict termination is given to the commander in military doctrine.
Summation of Key Points
• The theater commander functions as the link between the strategic and operational levels of war. A key ingredient in a military plan attempting to achieve a political victory is the art of conflict termination. The theater commander's decision on when and how to execute hostilities and conflict termination weigh on post-hostility operations and whether or not the political objectives are achieved.
• Conflict termination must be planned for early and continuously. The backwards planning approach assists the theater commander in conflict termination and in the planning for post-hostility operations. Everything depends upon the political desired end state. All phases of planning for conflict and the execution of the conflict itself must be devised and assessed with the political desired end state in mind.
• There is a compelling requirement for POTUS/SECDEF to clearly express the political desired end state to the theater commander. Reciprocally, the theater commander should express his military plan and how it will help achieve the political objectives to POTUS/ SECDEF, including how the theater commander proposes to terminate the conflict. This two-way communication channel must remain open and must be used continuously to ensure both military and political successes.
• The US national security interagency policymaking system is currently without unity of effort and unity of command. Multiple options exist for improved interagency cooperation and coordination. Most important is that a change be made to clearly delineate an agency or an individual beneath the President to take command of the interagency process.
• Conflict termination is a process, not a distinct phase. Many believe that by making it a separate and distinct phase of the strategic phases of conflict that the importance of conflict termination will be properly emphasized. 67 The argument here is that conflict termination is too important to be subordinated under other aspects in the planning process. However, conflict termination planning is a continuum, and therefore, it should not be only considered during one particular phase.
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• The military must be mindful that conflict termination and the end to hostilities are not the end to their tasks. The theater commander is responsible for military integration into post-hostility actions as well, and may be assigned as the lead agency for the posthostility phase as is seen in the current conflict in Iraq. This vital phase is often the most difficult and includes transitioning control from the military to DoS, non-governmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, and/or a new host-nation government.
• Individual service doctrine is important because it provides officers with their primary education. In general, individual service publications do not offer enough detail about conflict termination planning. No service publication has planning checklists or detailed phase planning criteria. Latest versions of each publication are improvements, but more emphasis on conflict termination and how to conduct it still remains insufficient in service doctrine.
• The contingency planning process is not normally time critical, so significant changes need not be made in order to deal with conflict termination. JP 3-0, other joint publications, and especially CJCSM 3122.01 offer the theater commander and his staff sufficient guidance in planning for conflict termination as long as time allows the review.
However, CAP is time sensitive, so changes to the CAP checklists should be made to remind the commander to plan early and continuously for conflict termination. US military doctrine embraces the key concepts of conflict termination, but fails to give the theater commander the methods to accomplish it or the checklists to guide staffs through planning for it. To assist planners, detailed checklists for all phases of planning should be promulgated and conflict termination criteria should be listed for each phase.
Recommendations
• Make conflict termination the subject matter of an annex to all operation plans and operation orders. Similar to an intelligence plan or a logistics plan, conflict termination is a process which exists throughout all phases of planning and execution. In order to emphasize the importance of conflict termination to the theater commander and to remind him to continuously think of conflict termination as a process, a conflict termination annex is justified.
• Amend CJCSM 3122.01 so that it includes specific references to conflict termination planning and considerations during each phase of CAP. Responsibilities for conflict termination by POTUS/SECDEF and the theater commander can be clearly delineated in this manual. Specific conflict termination criteria should be listed for planners to review.
• Reemphasize the importance of conflict termination criteria in all service schools and in service doctrinal publications. Single service action during a conflict, though unlikely, is possible, especially at the tactical level. Tactical level operations can have significant impact on the operational and strategic plans. Additionally, the military officer corps' initial education is founded in individual service doctrine, and it is from there that officers develop and may eventually serve a joint tour. Therefore, service publications should echo joint publications in their detail and emphasis of conflict termination considerations.
Conclusion
The relationship between conflict termination and conflict resolution determines the ultimate value of the fighting (and dying) in which the military engages. 69 The theater commander is the link between the operational campaign and the strategic political objectives.
Therefore, his role in planning and executing conflict termination is critical to achieving the US national objectives. Since the interagency supports the theater commander in his conflict planning, execution, and termination, the process must be streamlined and made more responsive. Additionally, by improving both joint and individual service publications with respect to detailed conflict termination criteria and checklists, the theater commander and his staff will be better able to accomplish the lofty and always difficult task of planning and executing conflict termination in support of US national objectives. Wars will always be easier to start than they are to conclude. The time to help theater commanders and their planners better conclude wars (conflict termination) is now.
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